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1. Introduction 
Modern macroeconomic research on consumption/saving starts with Keynes (1936), 
who puts forward his well-known consumption function. An important implication of the 
Keynesian consumption function is that saving rate increases with income. However, while 
this predication is consistent with cross-section evidence, it is not consistent with time-
series evidence. For example, in a seminal contribution, Kuznets (1946) discovered that the 
saving rate in the United States was remarkably stable from 1869 to 1938, although 
people’s income increased significantly over this period.1 Thus, the long-run consumption 
function implies that saving rate is constant with economic development. This important 
“consumption puzzle” motivated the celebrated contributions of the life-cycle hypothesis 
by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and the permanent-income hypothesis by Friedman 
(1957). In fact, the analysis and explanation for this consumption puzzle remains to be a 
fundamental issue in the teaching of modern macroeconomics.2 
 Despite an outpouring of early research on the “consumption puzzle” in the 1950s 
and 1960s, little work has been done since then although this puzzle was not completely 
resolved either empirically or theoretically. Recently, an empirical contribution by Dynan, 
Skinner and Zeldes (2004) significantly fills this gap and revives the old question of 
whether richer people save a larger fraction of their income. Using several large data sets, 
they find a strong positive relationship between saving rates and lifetime income. This 
important empirical finding makes the old “consumption puzzle” more intriguing, because 
                                                 
1 Many later studies also confirmed Kuznets’ finding based on more recent and larger data sets (see the 
survey by Modigliani (1986)). 
2 It is illustrated in several influential textbooks, such as Dornbusch and Fischer (1994), Gordon (2003), and 
Mankiw (2003). 
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it shows that the average propensity to consume decreases not only with current income 
but also with lifetime income. Moreover, this puzzle can be illustrated by the familiar 
international comparison of saving rates: If richer people have higher saving rates, why 
hasn’t the United States, which has been the most wealthy nation in the world, had a higher 
saving rate than many much poorer countries? 
 The current paper attempts to help resolve this puzzle. It extends the related 
literature by examining individuals’ intertemporal choices with the explicit consideration 
of intergenerational altruism. This extension is empirically important because 
intergenerational transfers account for an important part of aggregate saving.3 Indeed, as 
demonstrated by Barro (1974) and Becker (1988), understanding intergenerational links is 
often crucial for the study of consumption, saving, and other macroeconomic issues. 
 Our model implies that an individual is more concerned about her offspring’s future 
wealth when the individual expects that her offspring’s own endowment in the future is 
relatively low. The analysis shows that the bequests from parents to children decrease with 
children’s future mean income and increases with parental income. Thus, the model has the 
following implications. First, at a given point in time, richer people have higher saving 
rates, because they are concerned that their children are likely to receive lower incomes 
than theirs. In other words, a household with higher lifetime income saves more in order to 
leave more bequests to its offspring, who are likely to be worse off. Second, over time, 
when an economy experiences economic growth and the mean income of the economy 
rises, individuals will reduce their bequests because their offspring are expected to be 
                                                 
3 See the surveys and discussions of the empirical literature in Section 2.2. 
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equally well off due to the economic growth. Consequently, the saving rate can be 
approximately constant over time if the impacts of the increase in one’s lifetime income 
and the increase in her offspring’s future mean income on her consumption cancel out each 
other. Thus, this model helps explain the consumption puzzle and reconcile the short-run 
and long-run consumption functions. 
 In what follows, Section 2 provides a brief literature review; Section 3 examines 
the consumption functions both in the long run and in the short run and provides an 
explanation for the consumption puzzle; Section 4 provides an extension of the basic 
model by examining the relationship between the uncertainty of children’s future earnings 
and parental consumption and bequests; Section 5 offers the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 The Consumption Functions and the “Consumption Puzzle” 
The Keynesian consumption function can be written as follows,  
bYaC +=  
where C denotes consumption, Y denotes disposable income, a and b are both positive 
coefficient, and 0 < b < 1. The Keynesian consumption function, as simple as it is, has 
become a cornerstone in short-run macroeconomics, such as the IS-LM model. 
 From this consumption function, the saving rate can be derived as  
)1( b
Y
a
Y
CYs −+−=−≡  
Clearly, the above equation implies that the saving rate increases with income, Y. This 
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predication is consistent with cross-section evidence. Moreover, in a recent empirical 
contribution, Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) find that saving rates are positively 
correlated not only with current income but also with lifetime income. 
 However, as discussed in the introduction, the saving rate remained remarkably 
stable in the United States over time although most Americans became much richer. So, the 
long-run consumption function is defined in some textbooks (e.g. Mankiw, 2003) as 
follows:  
YcC =  
where c  is a positive constant. Indeed, the above long-run consumption function is 
consistent with a key assumption of the Solow growth model that the saving rate of an 
economy is constant with economic development (Solow, 1956). 
 The treatments of the consumption puzzle in modern textbooks of macroeconomics 
are the applications of the life-cycle hypothesis and the permanent-income hypothesis. For 
example, based on Modigliani’s Nobel Prize speech, Mankiw (2003) describes it as 
follows: An individual lives for T years and works for R years. The individual has an 
annual salary, Y, if he works, and has an initial wealth, W. Assuming a perfect 
consumption-smoothing motive, the individual’s annual consumption is  
Y
T
R
T
W
T
RYWC +=+=  
so  
T
R
TY
W
Y
C +=  
Then, the explanation proceeds as follows. In the short run, W is constant and hence the 
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consumption function is like the Keynesian consumption function; in the long run, W 
increases with Y in the same proportion and hence the saving (consumption) rate is 
constant over time. 
 However, natural questions arise: Where does the initial wealth come from? Why 
does the initial wealth increase with income? In another influential textbook, Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1994, p. 303, Footnote 8) suggest that the initial wealth comes from bequests. 
In the same footnote, they also add: “In the fully developed life-cycle model, the individual, 
in calculating lifetime consumption, has also to take account of any bequests he or she may 
want to leave.” Thus, more theoretical analyses that explicitly incorporates individuals’ 
bequest motive are needed to reconcile the short-run and long-run consumption functions. 
 The permanent-income hypothesis of Friedman (1957) also provides an explanation 
for the consumption puzzle. It argues that an individual’s consumption is determined by 
both her current income and her income in the previous period. On one hand, if the income 
in the previous period does not change (in the short run), an individual with higher current 
income will save more. On the other hand, if an economy experiences economic growth so 
that individuals recognize that their income in the previous period keeps increasing, their 
consumption will also increase over time. 4  Our model provides an extension of the 
application of the permanent-income hypothesis in explaining the consumption puzzle, by 
regarding offspring’s mean income as a permanent income (of a dynasty) from an 
intergenerational perspective. As the permanent-income hypothesis emphasizes that people 
experience random and temporary changes in their incomes, this extension is particularly 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1994) and Gordon (2003) for detailed explanations. 
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interesting. It is because the randomness of offspring’s future incomes is usually much 
greater than the randomness of one’s own income, for example, due to the uncertainty of 
the offspring’s abilities and market luck. Our model investigates the effects of the changes 
of offspring’s mean income on an individual’s consumption/saving behaviors. This 
extension is especially useful in explaining the new empirical finding of Dynan, Skinner 
and Zeldes (2004) that there is a strong positive relationship between saving rates and 
lifetime income. 
 
2.2 Evidence on Intergenerational Transfers and Intergenerational Mobility 
The substantial empirical research in the past few decades reveals that 
intergenerational transfers is a significant part of aggregate saving.5 Dynan, Skinner, and 
Zeldes (2002) point out three aspects to observe the importance of bequests in saving. First, 
bequests are often seen to be common and sizable. Second, bequests are often expected by 
the recipients. 6  Third, most parents care about their children and value transferring 
resources to their children. 
 Also, there are a large number of empirical studies showing that there is a strong 
intergenerational correlation of economic status. For example, the intergenerational income 
elasticity between fathers and sons is estimated to be 0.4 or higher in the USA (Solon, 
1992), 0.23 in Canada (Corak and Heisz, 1999), and 0.57 in Britain (Dearden, Machin, and 
Reed, 1997).7   As shown empirically and theoretically in Bevan (1979), Behrman, Pollak, 
                                                 
5 For example, see the surveys by Kotlikoff (1988), Gale and Scholz (1994), and Mulligan (1997). 
6 Weil (1994), for example, provides such an empirical study by comparing the saving of the elderly in micro 
and macro data. 
7 See Solon (2002) for the survey of the empirical studies in many other countries. 
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and Taubman (1989), Davies and Kuhn (1991), Galor and Zeira (1993), Mulligan (1999), 
Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), among others, the difference in intergenerational transfers 
among rich and poor families is an important source of persistent income inequality, 
particularly when households face borrowing constraints.  
Moreover, there is much evidence demonstrating that liquidity constraints affected a 
substantial proportion of U.S. consumers, particularly young individuals (Zeldes, 1989; 
Cox, 1990; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995). In this case, parents’ transfers can 
significantly alleviate children’s liquidity constraint and hence increase children’s welfare. 
Indeed, Cox (1990) shows that intergenerational transfers are often allocated to liquidity-
constrained consumers. Therefore, intergenerational transfers are an important source of 
intergenerational inequality, which suggests that parents have strong bequest motives if 
they are concerned about children’s welfare.  
 
3. The Model 
We consider an economy which is populated by a large number of families. Every 
family has one parent and one child. A parent’s wealth is denoted by tY , which is a 
parameter in the model and may differ across families. The current model is based on the 
altruism model of Becker and Tomes (1979), who assume that parents obtain utility not 
only from their own consumption, but also from the “quality” of their children. Specifically, 
Becker and Tomes (1979) measure a child’s “quality” by the child’s total future wealth and 
assume that an individual obtains utility from her material consumption, tC , and his 
child’s total future wealth, 1+tY . Since a child’s future income is uncertain, 1+tY  is a random 
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variable when the parent makes decisions on consumption and bequests. A parent’s utility 
function is defined as follows,  
 )()( 1++ tt YEvCu  (1) 
where E stands for the expectation operator. We assume  
 0)('',0)(',0)('',0)(' 11 <><> ++ tttt YvYvCuCu  (2) 
 We denote a parent’s bequests to her child by tB . Then, we have  
 ttt YBC =+  (3) 
and 
 1)1( +=++ tt YBrw  (4) 
where r is the interest rate, and w is the child’s future endowment. We assume that r is a 
constant and w is a random variable. Also, we assume that ),0(~ ∞w  and   
xw µ≡  
where µ  is a positive parameter. Note that µ  is a key parameter of the model. Clearly, the 
greater is µ , the greater is the child’s expected future income. We denote that the density 
function of x  by ()f . Based on the above description, we can rewrite (1) as  
 dxxfxBrvBYu ttt )(])1[()( 0 µ++∫+− ∞  (5) 
We assume that the optimal solutions are interior, which is the focus of this paper.8 Taking 
the derivation of (5) with respect to tB , we get the first order condition as  
                                                 
8 Note that under some circumstances, children’s future earnings may be very low or they may be subject to 
liquidity constraints. In this case, parents’ marginal utility from bequests will be very high. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that if bequests approaches zero, the marginal utility from bequests will be very large, 
which rules out the corner solution of intergenerational transfers for most parents. 
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 0)(])1[(')1()(' 0 =++∫++−− ∞ dxxfxBrvrBYu ttt µ  (6) 
From (6), we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Under the above stated assumptions, we have:  
(i) 10 <<
t
t
dY
dB
.  (ii) 0<µd
dBt . 
 
Proof. (i) Totally differentiating (6) with respect to tB  and tY , and then rearranging, we 
get  
 
dxxfvru
u
dY
dB
t
t
)('')1(''
''
0
2 ∞∫++=  (7) 
From (2), we know 0'' <u  and 0)(''0 <∫∞ dwwfv . Thus, both the numerator and the 
denominator of the right hand side of (7) are negative; the absolute value of the numerator 
of the right hand side of (7) is less than that of the denominator. Therefore, we have 
10 <<
t
t
dY
dB
 
 (ii) Totally differentiating (6) with respect to tB  and µ , and rearranging, we have,  
 0
)('')1(''
)('')1(
0
2
0 <∫++
∫+−= ∞
∞
dxxfvru
dxxfxvr
d
dBt
µ  (8) 
■ 
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 Noting ttt BYC −= , we have  
t
t
t
t
dY
dB
dY
dC −= 1  and µµ d
dB
d
dC tt −=  
Then, from Proposition 1, obviously, we have the following corollary. 
 
Corollary 1: Under the above stated assumptions, we have  
10 <∂
∂<
t
t
Y
C
 and 0>∂
∂
µ
tC  
  
Since an individual’s consumption is determined by her own income and her child’s 
expected future income, as a first order approximation, we can write an individual’s 
“consumption function” as follows:  
 πµη += tt YC  (9) 
where 
t
t
Y
C
∂
∂=η , µπ ∂
∂= tC . By Corollary 1, 0>π , and the “marginal propensity to 
consume,” η, is between 0 and 1. In the following, we can show that the consumption 
function (9) provides an explanation for the empirical observation about the “average 
propensity to consume” (i.e. 
t
t
Y
C
) in the short run and in the long run. 
 An important component of Keynes’ general theory (1936) is the Keynesian 
consumption function, which implies the average propensity to consume decreases with 
income. However, as discussed in the introduction, empirical evidence shows that while 
this implication is consistent with cross-sectional evidence, it is rejected by time-series 
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evidence. This paper helps explain these seemingly contradictory findings. From (9), the 
“average propensity to consume” is  
 tt
t
YY
C µπη +=
 (10) 
 In the short run, children’s future mean income, µ , is constant, so the “average 
propensity to consume”, 
t
t
Y
C
, decreases with income, tY . This implication is consistent 
with the empirical finding by Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) that there is a strong 
negative relationship between consumption rates and lifetime income. In the long run, µ  
and the mean of tY  increase in the same proportion, which implies that over time, the 
“average propensity to consume” in aggregate remains approximately constant as tY  (and 
µ) rises. Thus, from an intergenerational perspective, Corollary 1 presents a new 
explanation for the consumption puzzle and helps provide reconciliation for the short-run 
and long-run consumption functions. 
 As a matter of fact, the essential idea of this paper is similar to that of an early 
empirical study by Brady and Friedman (1947), which Modigliani (1986, p.298) describes 
as a “path-breaking contribution” in his Nobel Prize speech. Brady and Friedman (1947) 
offer the first intuitive reconciliation for the short-run and long-run consumption functions 
with supporting evidence. They show that at a given point in time, households with higher 
income save a larger fraction of their income, which confirms Keynes’ conjecture. 
However, over time, the consumption function shifted up as mean income increased. 
Consequently, the saving rate can be approximately constant in the long run. The current 
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paper provides a further explanation for the empirical finding of Brady and Friedman 
(1947) from an intergenerational perspective. 
 
4. An Extension: Intergenerational Uncertainty and the Consumption 
Function 
In this section, we provide an extension of the basic model by analyzing the 
uncertainty of children’s future incomes as another possible determinant of the 
consumption function.9  This extension is in line with an emphasis in Becker and Tomes 
(1979) that the uncertainties of children’s future income may also affect parents’ incentives 
of intergenerational transfers. For example, Becker and Tomes (1979) argue that since 
“market luck” and “endowment luck” differ across individuals, a child’s future earnings 
can be very uncertain. In this section, we conduct an analysis that helps understand how 
the uncertainty of children’s future incomes affects parents’ behaviors in bequests and 
consumption. 
 To provide a benchmark of comparison, we first consider the situation in which 
there is no uncertainty as for children’s future income. In this case, we denote a child’s 
future income by w ,10 which is a positive constant. Then, we can write a parent’s utility 
function as follows,  
 
])1[()(
)()( 1
wBrvBYu
YEvCu
ttt
tt
+++−=
+ +  (11) 
                                                 
9 It should be noted the analysis of the last section does take into account that children’s future incomes are 
uncertain. However, the analysis in this section analyzes this issue in much greater detail. 
10 In relation to the notations in the last section, we may regard w  as being equal to µEx. 
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The first order condition of (11) is  
 0])1[(')1()(' =++++−− wBrvrBYu ttt  (12)  
We denote the solution to (12) by CB . 
 Next, we add uncertainty into the analysis by assuming that a child’s future income 
is  
zw ~+  
where z~  is a random variable with mean zero.11  Namely,  
 0)
~( =zE  (13) 
In this case, we can write a parent’s utility function as follows,  
 ]
~)1[()(
)()( 1
zwBrEvBYu
YEvCu
ttt
tt
++++−=
+ +
 (14) 
The first order condition of (14) is  
 0]
~)1[(')1()(' =+++++−− zwBrEvrBYu ttt  (15) 
We denote the solution to (15) by UB . Suppose that the distribution of z~  does not 
degenerate into a single point zero. Then, we have the following lemma. 
 
Lemma 1: Under the above stated assumptions, if 0''' >v , then CU BB > . 
 
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Suppose not, namely, suppose that CU BB ≤ . Then, 
we have 
                                                 
11 In relation to the notations in the last section, we may regard z~  as being equal to wx −µ . 
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 Ct
U
t BYBY −≥−  (16) 
Recall that 0'' <u . Then (16) implies  
 )(')(' Ct
U
t BYuBYu −≤−  (17) 
 Also, note that 0''' >v  means that the function, 'v , is convex, which implies  
 
])1[('
)]~()1[('
]}~)1[({'
]~)1[('
wBrv
zEwBrv
zwBrEv
zwBrEv
t
t
t
t
++=
+++=
+++>
+++
 (18) 
If CU BB ≤ , then from (18) and 0'' <v , we have  
 ])1[('
])1[('
]~)1[('
wBrv
wBrv
zwBrEv
C
U
U
++≥
++>
+++
 (19) 
 Since CB  and UB  are the solutions to (12) and (15) respectively, we have  
 0])1[(')1()(' =++++−− wBrvrBYu CCt  (20)  
and  
 0]
~)1[(')1()(' =+++++−− zwBrEvrBYu UUt  (21) 
 Also, from (17) and (19), we have  
 ])1[(')1()('
]~)1[(')1()('
wBrvrBYu
zwBrEvrBYu
CC
t
UU
t
++++−−>
+++++−−
 (22) 
Then, from (20) and (22), we get  
 0]
~)1[(')1()(' >+++++−− zwBrEvrBYu UUt  (23) 
Clearly, (23) is in contradiction with (21). Thus, we have proved this proposition. ■ 
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 Note that the assumption, 0''' >v , is commonly made in the existing literature of an 
individual’s precautionary saving in response to the uncertainty of her own future income 
(e.g., Kimball (1990)).12  Moreover, from the above analysis, it is easy to see that the 
greater is '''v , the greater is the difference between UB  and CB . Thus, under reasonable 
conditions, the uncertainty of children’s future income can be an important source of 
intergenerational transfers. 
 
 Next, we try to examine the monotonic relationship between the uncertainty of 
children’s future income and parents’ consumption. In doing so, we first modify the 
expression of the density function of x (in Section 3) into ),( δxf , where δ  denotes the 
standard error of x. Also, corresponding to the notations, CB  and UB , we denote CC  and 
UC  as an individual’s consumption when her child’s future income is certain and uncertain 
respectively. Then, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: (i) Under the above stated assumptions, if 0''' >v , then we have  
CC > UC   
                                                 
12 The received literature of precautionary saving has focused on the unpredictable future events that are 
associated with the individual herself, such as her uncertain lifetime, health and income. Thus, the analysis of 
this section complements the literature of precautionary saving by highlighting the randomness of children’s 
earnings as a major source of uncertainty. Moreover, largely because of the emphasis of the received 
literature, precautionary saving has usually been interpreted as a form of life-cycle saving when significant 
amount of bequests is observed (e.g. Modigliani, 1988). Lemma 1 complements the existing literature by 
exploring intergenerational uncertainty as another source of precautionary saving. Further, it indicates that 
precautionary saving can be partly the outcome of individuals’ bequest motives, and a part of “unintended” 
bequests may actually come from the uncertainty of children’s future earnings. 
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(ii) Under the above stated assumptions, 0<δd
dCt  if the following condition is satisfied 
 0),(])1[(' 20 >++∫∞ dxxfxBrv t δµ  (24) 
 
Proof. (i) Noting ttt BYC −= , the proof of Part (i) of Proposition 2 follows Lemma 1 
directly. 
 (ii) Replacing )(xf  with ),( δxf , we can rewrite the first order condition, (6), as  
 0),(])1[(')1()(' 0 =++∫++−− ∞ dxxfxBrvrBYu ttt δµ  (25) 
Totally differentiating (25) with respect to tB , δ  and rearranging, we get  
 
dxxfxBrvrBYu
dxxfxBrvr
d
dB
ttt
tt
),(])1[('')1()(''
),(])1[(')1(
0
2
20
δµ
δµ
δ ++∫++−
++∫+−= ∞
∞
 (26) 
Clearly, the denominator of the right hand side of (26) is negative. Thus, if (24) is satisfied, 
we will have 0>δd
dBt , which from ttt BYC −=  implies 0<δd
dCt . ■ 
 
 Part (1) of this proposition indicates that individuals may consume more if there is 
no uncertainty in their children’s future income. Part (2) of Proposition 2 implies that under 
some additional conditions, an individual’s marginal propensity to consume with respect to 
the marginal changes of the uncertainty of her children’s future income is negative. 
Therefore, if the income distribution of an economy becomes more equal, people tend to 
consume more and leave fewer bequests to their children. 13 In sum, Proposition 2 suggests 
                                                 
13 The implication of this proposition appears to be consistent with some empirical observations. For example, 
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that the change of the uncertainty of children’s future income may affect the consumption 
function, and the estimation of the magnitude of this impact can be an interesting topic in 
future empirical research. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 An important implication of the Keynesian consumption function is that saving rate 
increases with income. However, this predication is consistent only with cross-section 
evidence but not with time-series evidence. This consumption puzzle, which motivated the 
Noble Prize winning contributions of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman 
(1957), is clearly one of the most important empirical findings. More recently, a 
comprehensive empirical study by Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004) finds a strong 
positive relationship between saving rates and lifetime income. This important finding 
makes the old “consumption puzzle” more intriguing, and calls for more theoretical 
analysis to explain why the richer has a higher saving rate in cross-section data but there is 
no strong correlation between income and saving rate in time-series data or in international 
comparisons. The current paper attempts to help fill this gap. It extends the related existing 
literature by examining individuals’ intertemporal choices from an intergenerational 
perspective. 
 Our model implies that an individual is more concerned about her offspring’s future 
wealth when the individual expects that her offspring’s own endowment in the future is 
                                                                                                                                                    
Couch and Dunn (1997) estimate that the intergenerational income elasticity between fathers and sons is only 
0.11 in Germany, where the uncertainty of children’s future net earnings is relatively small due to substantial 
income redistribution through tax and subsidy. Moreover, Galor and Moav (2004) also emphasize the 
importance of income distribution for saving and bequests from a perspective different from the current paper. 
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relatively low. It shows that the bequests from parents to children decrease with children’s 
mean income and increases with parental income. Thus, at a given point in time, richer 
people have higher saving rates, because they are concerned that their children are likely to 
receive lower incomes than theirs. In other words, a household with higher lifetime income 
saves more in order to leave more bequests to its offspring, who are likely to be worse off. 
However, over time, when an economy experiences economic growth and the mean 
income of the economy rises, individuals will reduce their bequests because their offspring 
are expected to be equally well off due to the economic growth. Consequently, the saving 
rate can be approximately constant over time if the impacts of the increase in one’s lifetime 
income and the increase in her offspring’s future mean income on her consumption cancel 
out each other. Thus, this model helps explain the consumption puzzle and reconcile the 
short-run and long-run consumption functions. 
 Furthermore, we provide an extension of the basic model by analyzing the 
uncertainty of children’s future incomes as another possible determinant of the 
consumption function. The analysis indicates that individuals will consume more if there is 
no uncertainty as for their children’s future income. Also, under some reasonable 
conditions, it shows that an individual’s marginal propensity to consume with respect to the 
marginal changes of the uncertainty of her children’s future income is negative. Therefore, 
as the income distribution of an economy becomes more equal, people may tend to 
consume more and leave fewer bequests to their children. 
 We have used the simplest model in order to highlight the essential idea of the 
paper. In future research, we can continue to examine the issues of consumption, saving 
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and intergenerational transfers in several ways. For example, the model can be extended to 
examine more detailed interactions between parents and children in a framework in which 
parents obtain utility from the quantity and the quality of their offspring and may be 
concerned about offspring’s survival probability if the economy is poor.14 Also, in future 
research we may incorporate the uncertainty facing the parents themselves, such as 
uncertain lifetime and the possibility of illness, together with the uncertainty of children’s 
future income in a unified framework in analyzing a household’s decisions in consumption, 
saving and bequest. 
                                                 
14 For example, see Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav (2002). 
 21
References 
 
 
Barro, Robert J. (1974), “Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?” Journal of Political 
Economy 48(6): 1095-118. 
 
Becker, Gary (1988), “Family Economics and Macro Behavior,” American Economic 
Review, 78(1): 1-13. 
 
Becker, Gary and Nigel Tomes (1979), “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of 
Income and Intergenerational Mobility”, Journal of Political Economy, 87(6): 1153-
1189. 
 
Behrman, Jere R., Robert A. Pollak, and Paul Taubman (1989), “Family Resources, Family 
Size, and Access to Financing for College Education,” Journal of Political Economy, 
97(2): 398-419. 
 
Bevan, D. L. (1979), “Inheritance and the Distribution of Wealth,” Economica, 46(184): 
381-402. 
 
Brady, D. S. and R. D. Friedman (1947), “Savings and the Income Distribution,” NBER 
Studies in Income and Wealth, No. 9, New York. 
 
Corak, Miles and Andrew Heisz (1999), “The Intergenerational Earnings and Income 
Mobility of Canadian Men: Evidence from Longitudinal Income Tax Data,” Journal 
of Human Resources, 34(3): 504-533. 
 
Couch, Kenneth A. and Thomas A. Dunn (1997), “Intergenerational Correlations in Labor 
Market Status: A Comparison of the United States and Germany,” Journal of Human 
Resources, 32(1): 210-232. 
 
Cox, Donald (1990), “Intergenerational Transfers and Liquidity Constraints,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 105(1): 187-217. 
 
Davies, James B. and Peter J. Kuhn (1991), “A Dynamic Model of Redistribution, 
Inheritance, and Inequality,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 24(2): 324-344. 
 
Dearden, Lorraine, Stephen Machin, and Howard Reed (1997), “Intergenerational Mobility 
in Britain,” Economic Journal, 107(440): 47-66. 
 
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Stanley Fischer (1994), Macroeconomics, New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
 
 22
Dynan, Karen E., Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes (2002), “The Importance of 
Bequests and Life-Cycle Saving in Capital Accumulation: A New Answer,” American 
Economic Review, 92(2): 274-278. 
 
Dynan, Karen E., Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes (2004), “Do the Rich Save 
More?” Journal of Political Economy, 112(2): 397-444. 
 
Friedman, Milton (1957), A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav (2002), “Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic 
Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 1133-92. 
 
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav (2004), “From Physical to Human Capital Accumulation: 
Inequality and the Process of Development,” Review of Economic Studies, 71(4): 
1001-26. 
 
Galor, Oded and David N. Weil (2000), “Population, Technology, and Growth: From 
Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond,” American 
Economic Review, 90: 806-28. 
 
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira (1993), “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics,” Review 
of Economic Studies, 60: 35-52. 
 
Gale, William G. and John Karl Scholz (1994), “Intergenerational Transfers and the 
Accumulation of Wealth, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(4): 145-60. 
 
Gordon, Robert J. (2003), Macroeconomics, Boston: Addison-Wesley. 
 
Hubbard, R. Glenn, Jonathan Skinner, and Stephen P. Zeldes (1995), “Precautionary 
Saving and Social Insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 103(2): 360-399. 
 
Keynes, John Maynard (1936), General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New 
York: Harcourt, Brace. 
 
Kimball, Miles S. (1990), “Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large,” 
Econometrica, 58(1): 53-73. 
 
Kotlikoff, Laurence J. (1988), “Intergenerational Transfers and Saving,” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 2: 41-58. 
 
Kuznets, S. S. (1946), National Income: A Summary of Findings, NBER, New York: Arno 
Press. 
 
 23
Mankiw, N. Gregory (2003), Macroeconomics, New York: Worth Publishers. 
 
Modigliani, Franco (1986), “Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the Wealth of Nations,” 
American Economic Review 76(3): 297-313. 
 
Modigliani, Franco (1988), “The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle 
Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2(2): 15-
40. 
 
Modigliani, F. and R. Brumberg (1954), “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: 
An Interpretation of Cross-section Data,” K.K. Kurihara, eds. Post-Keynesian 
Economics. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B. (1997), Parental Priorities and Economic Inequality, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Mulligan, Casey B. (1999), “Galton versus the Human Capital Approach to Inheritance,” 
Journal of Political Economy, 107(6): S184-S224. 
 
Restuccia, Diego and Carlos Urrutia (2004), “Intergenerational Persistence of Earnings: 
The Role of Early and College Education,” American Economic Review, 94(5): 1354-
1378. 
 
Solon, Gary (1992), “Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States,” American 
Economic Review, 82(3): 393-408. 
 
Solon, Gary (2002), “Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16(3): 59-66. 
 
Solow, Robert M. (1956), “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 70(1): 65-94. 
 
Weil, David N. (1994), “The Saving of the Elderly in Micro and Macro Data,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 109(1): 55-81. 
 
Zeldes, Stephen P. (1989), “Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical 
Investigation,” Journal of Political Economy, 97(2): 305-346. 
 
 
